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Maintaining the Constitutionality of the
Patent System
by

SUSANNA CHENETTE*

I.

Introduction

The Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
This provision (hereinafter "the Clause") enables
Discoveries[.]"'
Congress to create patent protection2 for inventors provided that such
protection promotes the progress of "useful arts.",3 The scope and
implementation of patent protection has changed significantly since the
adoption of the Constitution: patentability requirements have changed,4
patentable subject matter has expanded, 5 the Federal Circuit has been
J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
Susanna
graduated from the University of Chicago in 2003 with her AB in Biology. In fall of 2008, she
will begin as an associate at White & Case in Palo Alto, California, where she will focus on
patent law. Before attending law school, she worked as a research technologist performing
cellular and molecular research at the University of Chicago.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. This grant also permits Congress to create copyright protection, see U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 8, but this paper only focuses on patent protection.
3. Note that "[i]n 1787 'science' meant knowledge or learning, and did not have the
significance of technology it does today. Thomas Jefferson, who administered the first patent act,
used science consistent with this meaning of knowledge and learning." Arthur H. Seidel, The
Constitution and a Standard of Patentability,48 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y., 5, 11-12
(1966) (internal citations omitted). "'[S]cience' ... meant knowledge in any field and it included
all fields. Dr. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary, contemporaneous with the Constitution, defines
'science' as: 1. Knowledge[,] 2. Certainty grounded on demonstration[,] 3. Art attained by
precepts, or built on principles[,] 4. Any art or species of knowledge[.]" Giles S. Rich, Principles
of Patentability,42 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y., 75, 78 (1960).
4. For example, the non-obviousness requirement, not originally present in the Patent Act
of 1793, was later introduced by the Court in Hotchkiss. v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 264-65, 268
(1850) (substituting clay for metal or wood in doorknobs did not create a patentable invention).
5. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980) (holding that the language of
[221]
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designated to handle all appeals of patent cases, 6 the number of patent
filings with the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has grown
markedly,7 antitrust law has created special exceptions for patent-derived
monopolies, 8 and technologies have rapidly changed and developed.
Although Congress continues to monitor it,9 the patenting process has not
adequately adapted to accommodate these changes, which have had the
effect of expanding and strengthening patent rights. The result is a patent
system that is slowly departing from its constitutional aim of "promot[ing]
the progress of ... useful arts."

This note will explore the constitutional dimensions of the current
patent system. The Constitution requires any legislation for patent
protection to promote the progress of useful arts. Patent legislation abides
by this constitutional dictate by establishing a quid pro quo between
patentee and the public. The PTO and the courts evaluate patents for
compliance with this quidpro quo before the property right is either issued
or upheld.
Several requirements enforce this quid pro quo relationship between
patentee and society. These requirements, however, are not being enforced
strictly enough to ensure that the quid pro quo, and therefore the
constitutional aim of patenting, is satisfied. Rather, patentees are receiving
strong and remunerative patent rights without sufficiently benefiting the
public, and Congress, the courts, and the PTO are focused on promoting
economic success-"patent commerce"-instead of "useful arts."
Therefore, in order to preserve the quid pro quo of patenting, stricter
patenting standards for patentable subject matter, disclosure, nonobviousness, utility, and filing are necessary. Patents should be less
presumptively valid during litigation, and the PTO should spend more time
evaluating patent applications. Congress, the courts, and the PTO each
must be vigilant in enforcing heightened patentability standards to prevent
the patent system from impeding scientific research and the quest for
knowledge. Therefore, in the interests of preventing patent law from
35 U.S.C. § 101 encompasses as patentable subject matter "man-made" living organisms).
6. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 37, 37
(1982).
7. Tressa Jennifer James, Implications of the Best Mode Requirement on Patents Involving
Biotechnology, 2 HOuS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 96, 97 (2001).
8.

See PHILLIP AREEDA, Louis KAPLOW & AARON EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 104-05,

110-11 (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed. 2004).
9. Current legislation exists in Congress which proposes dramatic changes to the current
patent system. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). This Act
proposes to change our first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system as well as eliminate the best
mode disclosure requirement (thereby bringing it into harmony with the European Patent
Organization and the Japanese Patent Organization). Id.
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transgressing its constitutional remit, our courts and legislatures must enact
policies to ensure that patents issued are not merely economically
exploitative properties, but rather are proper, deserved, and effectively
promote the progress of science.

II. The Constitutional Language
The Clause in the Constitution that grants Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries [],10 was one of the few provisions unanimously
accepted without debate during the Convention." Even during the process
of state ratification, the Clause was never opposed, and only briefly
mentioned. 12 As historian Sidney Diamond comments, "[t]he delegates
clearly believed firmly that it was in the public interest to establish a patent
and copyright system."' 3 However, because of the limited objections,
nearly nothing is known of the Framer's intent behind the Clause other than
its evident facial meaning, 14 but the meaning of the Clause, even on its
face, is ambiguous. 15 There is consensus, however, on the point that the

10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. James Madison noted that the proposition was adopted nem:con (nemine contradicente,
or without dissent). 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 508-10 (Max
Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press. 1937).
12. For comments made during several state ratifying conventions, see 6 MATHEW CAREY,
THE AMERICAN MUSEUM 303 (Philadelphia, Pa. 1789).
13. Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent System... The Past is Prologue, 62 J. PAT. OFF.
SoC'Y. 437, 440 (1980).
14. Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1174-75 (1983) (stating "very
little is known of the drafters' intentions regarding the Copyright-Patent Clause beyond what is
apparent on its face").
15. Admittedly, many critics argue that much is lost by taking a "clausebound approach" to
the Constitution. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
124-25 (Yale Univ. Press 1998). However, commentators considering the Clause under both
"clausebound" and "full constitutional" approaches do not deny the existence of ambiguity. See
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progressof Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a
CongressionalPower, 43 IDEA 1, 18-21 (2003). Analysis under the two approaches tends to
result in a different understanding of the constitutional limitations of the clause. Id. at 20. Most
of this debate centers on whether Congress' power extends beyond the power to fulfill the
generalized grants of power ("to promote science" and "to promote ... useful arts") through
patents and copyrights, or whether it is limited to such mechanisms. Id. at 18, 20. However,
under the "full constitutional" approach, the language is obviously restrictive seeing as the Clause
is the only grant of power in the Constitution that prescribes appropriate legislative actions to
achieve a directed purpose. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress,
2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1153-54 (2000).
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Clause expressly enables Congress to create patent and copyright
protection.' 6 However, whether Congress is limited to creating only patent
and copyright protection in order "to7 promote the progress of science and
useful arts" is the subject of debate.'
For example, the judiciary has assumed many times that it is only
through the creation of patent and copyright protection that Congress may
legislate to promote science and the useful arts.' 8 For example, in In re
Bergy, Judge Rich advanced that "the only restraints placed on Congress
[by the Clause] pertained to the means by which it could promote useful
arts, namely, through the device of securing 'exclusive rights' which were
required to be limited in time ... ,19 Commentators and scholars, however,
posit that the language in the Constitution and the Framers' intent does not
limit Congress to acting only through the creation of these protections:
"[t]he grant of power in the Clause is much broader than is generally
supposed and is not limited to merely authority regarding patents and
copyrights., 20 This means that the language "by" in the Clause should
rather be read as "including," and that the entire generic grant of power
remains in the "to" language, which keeps the Clause consistent with the
other enumerated powers of Congress in the Constitution. 2' Although not
all concur in this construction, the alternative construction that Congress
can only act to promote the progress of the useful arts by creating patent
protection is exceedingly and unnecessarily limited.
The aforementioned debate is not the focus of this paper, but it is
important to note because it determines whether Congress can provide
incentives other than patent protection under the Clause. However, given
the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,2 2 it is unlikely that the

16. Many allocate the language of the Clause creating these abilities in Congress as follows:
(1) "to promote the progress of science... by securing for limited times to authors ... the
exclusive right to their writings" (the creation of copyright protection); and (2) "to promote the
progress of... useful arts by securing for limit times to ... inventors the exclusive right to
their... discoveries" (creation of patent protection). See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958
(C.C.P.A. 1979) ("Scholars who have studied this provision, its origins, and its subsequent
history, have, from time to time, pointed out that it is really two grants of power rolled into one;
first, to establish a copyright system and, second, to establish a patent system.").
17. See generally Walterscheid, supra note 15, at 18, 80-8 1.

18. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
19. Id. at 958 n. 2.
20. Walterscheid, supra note 15, at 80.
21. See id. at 18; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1-18.
22. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003) (reiterating that Congress' legislation
under the Clause is subject to rational basis review). The Court subjects Congressional
legislation under the Clause to rational basis rather than heightened judicial review because
legislating to create copyright and patent protection requires the balancing of myriad factors and
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Court 23 would find Congressional legislation under the Clause in a form
other than patent protection unconstitutional.
Most do agree, however, that the Clause is composed of two grants of
power: (1) a generalized authorization of power contained within "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts"; and (2) a method of
effectuating this generalized power by "securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and
discoveries. 24 The generalized power granted to Congress "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts ',,21 is explicit in the Constitution. 26

In

Goldstein v. California, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the Clause
"describes both the objective which Congress may seek and the means to
achieve it ....

The objective is to promote the progress of science and the

[useful] arts."2 7 Similarly Justice Douglas stated:
[E]very patent case involving validity presents a question which
requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution. Article
I, § 8, contains a grant to the Congress of the power to permit patents
to be issued. But, unlike most of the specific powers which
Congress is given, that grant is qualified. The Congress does not
have free rein, for example, to decide that patents should be easily or
freely given. The Congress acts under the restraint imposed by the
statement of purpose in Art. I, § 8. The purpose is "To promote the
for the Court to insert itself into this delicate process would be to run roughshod over years of
careful drafting and fine tuning. Id. at 204 & n.10. Therefore, any legislation enacted by
Congress under the Clause is evaluated by the Court for whether it is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest which presents a high bar for the courts to hold any congressional
legislation enacted under the Clause unconstitutional. Id. at 204.
23. The Supreme Court would be acting under its authority as the interpreter and
protectorate of the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that once
Congress has spoken it is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is" and determine its constitutionality).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Walterscheid, supra note 15, at 13 ("[The Clause] was
intended not only as an express authority to promote the progress of science and useful arts
generally, but also as a means of ensuring authority to do so in a particular way, namely, by
securing exclusive rights for limited times to authors and inventors in their respective writings
and discoveries.").
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. This is clear through common cannons of interpretation. President James Monroe
observed: "the order generally observed in grants [of power], an order founded on common sense,
since it promotes a clear understanding of their import, is to grant the power intended to be
conveyed in the most full and explicit manner, and then to explain or qualify it, if explanation or
qualification should be necessary. This order has, it is believed, been invariably observed in all
the grants contained in the Constitution." JAMES MONROE, VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS (1822), reprinted in 2
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, 144, 163 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897).
27. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
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The means for

achievement of that end is the grant for
28 a limited time to inventors of
the exclusive right to their inventions.

As Edward Walterscheid explains:
[In the Clausej a grant of power is first set forth in a full and explicit
manner, and then followed by an explanation or qualification. The
phrase "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" is an

infinitive verb form that constitutes the grant of power to Congress,
and the issue then becomes one of whether the phrase "by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their

respective writings and discoveries" constitutes an explanation or a
qualification of this grant power.29
According to the language of the Constitution, patents are clearly a
means to an end. Thus, under the Clause, Congress is only authorized to
pass legislation if it promotes the progress of science; legislation must
comply with this generalized aim for it to be constitutional.

III. Permissible Grants of Monopoly Power
Although the Clause itself was barely mentioned during ratification,
the Framers recognized that granting a patent right potentially conferred
monopoly power 30 to the patentee. Before the Constitution was ratified,
many voiced serious objections 3' about the creation of monopolies and
grants of monopoly power,3 2 although these complaints were not made in

28. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
29. Walterscheid, supra note 15, at 80-81.
30. It is important to note that although a patent right is often indiscernible from a
monopolistic position in a market, it is the patentee's exploitation of the right rather than the
PTO's conferral of the patent that creates a monopoly. A patent confers to a patentee only the
negative right to exclude others from practicing his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2007); 35
U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2007). The patentee may elect to develop his invention commercially and then
enforce his negative patent right so as to eliminate all competition and obtain a monopoly. See
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 36 (1923) (commenting that
"it is the fact that the patentee has invented or discovered something useful, and thus has the
common-law right to make, use, and vend it himself, which induces the Government to clothe
him with power to exclude everyone else from making, using, or vending it"). Therefore, a patent
enables a monopoly, but a patent in itself is not a monopoly.
31. Referring to the Necessary and Proper Clause, George Mason refused to sign the
Constitution because "[u]nder their own construction of the general clause at the end of the
enumerated powers, the congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce." 2 MATHEW
CAREY, THE AMERICAN MUSEUM 534-36 (Philadelphia, Pa. 1787).
32. Several state ratifying conventions recommended adding a limiting clause expressly
preventing Congress from forming monopolies. New York suggested: "that congress do not grant
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reference to the Clause.
After ratification, however, Thomas Jefferson expressed to James
Madison concerns about the possibility of monopoly power enabled under
the Clause.33
Letters exchanged between Jefferson and Madison
demonstrate their differing views about the Clause.3 4 Jefferson argued that
monopolies were inherently dangerous and therefore must be absolutely
avoided regardless of the circumstances under which they developed. 35 He
referred to the Clause specifically in one letter, writing, "[I]t is better.., to
abolish monopolies, in all cases, than not to do it in any. ' 36
Acknowledging that preventing monopolies by limiting patent and
copyright protection "lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred
by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time[,]" he added that even "the
benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of
their general suppression. 3 7
Madison's opinions were the opposite: he firmly believed that the
monopolies enabled by patent and copyright protection should be permitted
because of the good they were poised to confer upon society. 3 Somewhat
resigned to the presence of monopolies arising from patents and copyrights,
Jefferson responded by advocating an explicit limitation on the grant of the
Clause in the Bill of Rights that would prevent Congress from expanding
an individual's ability to obtain a monopoly. 39 At least this way, Jefferson
reasoned, monopolies created by patent or copyright protection would not
exceed a certain scope. 40 This limitation was never adopted.
Jefferson was not alone in fearing monopolies. Many others involved
monopolies, or erect any company with exclusive advantages of commerce"). 4 MATHEW
CAREY, THE AMERICAN MUSEUM 156 (Philadelphia, Pa. 1788). Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and North Carolina recommended "that Congress erect no company of merchants, with exclusive
advantages of commerce." 6 MATHEW CAREY, THE AMERICAN MUSEUM 303 (Philadelphia, Pa.
1789) (containing the remarks of Rev. Nicholas Cottin, D.D. on the amendments to the federal
constitution proposed by states).
33. See Walterscheid, supra note 15, at 5-7; see also Letters between Jefferson and Madison
in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS 512 (James Morton Smith ed., Norton 1995) [hereinafter
LETTERS].
34.
35.

See LETTERS, supra note 33, at 512.
Letter from Jefferson to Madison (July 31, 1788) in LETTERS, supra note 33, at 545.

36.

Id.

37. Id.
38. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (October 17, 1788) in LETTERS, supra note 33, at 566.
39. Jefferson specifically advocated that the Bill of Rights include the following limitation:
"Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature, and their own
inventions in the arts for a term not exceeding years, but for no longer term, and for no other
purpose." Letter from Jefferson to Madison (August 28, 1789) in LETTERS, supra note 33, at
630. This limitation was not adopted. See U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
40. Letter from Jefferson to Madison (August 28, 1789) in LETTERS, supra note 33, at 630.
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in drafting and ratifying the Constitution were similarly concerned. One
delegate even abandoned the drafting process because the document
contained no express limiting section. 4 1 Nevertheless these concerns were
never represented in any section of the resulting document.
Despite these objections, the majority of the Framers believed that
enabling the limited monopolies that patents facilitate would effectively
promote the useful arts.42 Madison in particular believed that types of
monopolies could be distinguished and sincerely thought that only good
would come to society through this grant: innovation would be
incentivized, and therefore more innovation would occur.43 This would
result in a net positive effect for society.44
However, "[t]he Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely
granted" because, although monopolies could benefit society, monopolies
too easily obtained would do a disservice by permitting monopoly control
over otherwise freely available goods and services. 45 Therefore the patent
system must enforce a true exchange, or quid pro quo, between the
inventor and society: the inventor must fully disclose to society his novel
and useful invention, and, in exchange, society will undergo a short-term
unilateral and possibly monopolistic control over the invention. In the
words of the Supreme Court, there is a "basic quid pro quo contemplated
by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly" and
it "is the
'46 benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility.
Practically, this means that an invention must be truly worthy of a
patent in order to receive one: monopolies formed from a patent must not
be more injurious than the invention is beneficial to society; patents must
not cover information that, if covered, would stagnate research and
progress; society must benefit from the inventor's full knowledge regarding
the invention; and, most importantly, the ultimate effect of the patent
41. Among others, George Mason, a delegate from Virginia who ultimately refused to sign
the Constitution largely because it lacked a Bill of Rights, was opposed to the Constitution
because "the congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce." See supra note 3 1.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8. This provision was adopted without debate. See THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787 at 508-10, supra note 11.
43.

See Walterscheid, supra note 15, at 6.

44.
45.

Id.
GreatAt. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring).

46. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (emphasis added). "The consideration an
inventor gives in return for a patent is the benefit which he confers upon the public by placing in
their hands a means through the use of their wants may be supplied." FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT

LAW AND POLICY 2 n. 5 (2003), available at http://www.flc.gov/ os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Report].
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system must confer net benefits to society.
Since the adoption of the Constitution, scholars of intellectual
property rights have developed more sophisticated rationales for justifying
the patent system 47, including: (1) natural property rights; 48 (2) rewarding
services rendered; 49 (3) monopoly profits incentives; 50 and, (4) encouraging
information sharing through the publication of both patent applications and
issued patents.5 1 Inherent in each of these rationales is the basic exchange
of patenting, the quid pro quo52
The statutory patentability requirements maintain this quid pro quo.
Novelty 53 ensures that nothing is removed from the public domain that was
54
previously accessible and that the patentee does not benefit frivolously.
Obviousness 5 5 guarantees that there is at most a "flash of creative
genius, ,,56 and at lleast that the invention is not obvious to a person of
47. See Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31
(1989); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectualProperty, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
48. This theory derives from the teachings of John Locke on natural labor theory. See JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, para. 26 (1690), available at
http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/Locke/second/second-frame.html.
When a person puts work
into a commonly held object, he may appropriate it; the appropriation is justified by his property
right in his labor which was introduced into the object. Id.
49. The inventor has given a valuable service to society, so in return society rewards him
with a patent.
50. The promise of profits that could be derived from successful exploitation of the negative
property right provides necessary incentives to encourage people to invent and contribute to the
pool of knowledge. Therefore patent monopolies encourage new discoveries.
51. People will be more willing to disclose information about their discoveries to the public
if they can trade those disclosures for governmental protection of their ideas. Without this
protection, people might invent, but would not disclose what they have discovered.
52. The quid pro quo that will ultimately promote the progress of the useful arts is satisfied
when the patentee benefits from the deserved patent, and the public benefits both from disclosure
of information about the invention, and from the utility it provides; however, the benefit to the
patentee must not exceed the benefit to the public. See Manson, 383 U.S. at 534-35.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. V.2005).
54. See Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Cont'l
Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing anticipation);
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing
inherency).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000 & Supp. V. 2005).
56. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1941) (referring to
Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 270). The Patent Act of 1952 subsequently codified an obviousness
standard. See 35 U.S.C. § 103. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the codification overruled
the Hotchkiss standard. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (interpreting
section 103 "to abolish the test [Congress] believed [the Supreme Court] announced in the
controversial phrase 'flash of creative genius,' used in Cuno Corp.. ").Currently, the inquiry
for nonobviousness is a question of law that is based on an underlying multi-step factual inquiry
into various factors. Id. 17-18. These factors that a court will consider are commonly referred to
as the "Graham factors" and include: (1)the level of ordinary skill in the art; (2) scope and
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ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time the invention is made. 7
Utility 58 measures whether the invention provides use or benefit sufficient
to warrant a patent.5 9 The disclosure requirements 60 force the patentee to
62
61
publish information about his invention sufficient to describe and enable
it so that the invention is fully revealed to the public. Finally, our "first to
invent ' 63 system ensures that the patent rewards the one who demonstrated
the desired inventive and inquisitive activity.
Each of these elements fortifies a balanced quid pro quo exchange,
which is why each must be vigilantly enforced by the PTO and the courts.
In the absence of aggressive application of these statutory requirements,
patents will issue that fail the constitutional standard. Yet recent patent law
alterations, actions by the Federal Circuit, and looming changes by
Congress indicate a trend toward undermining or eliminating some of these
requirements, which may affect continued satisfaction of the quidpro quo.
This ultimately frustrates the constitutional aims of patenting.

IV. Evidence of Quid Pro Quo Erosion
A.

Disclosure
The disclosure requirements contained within 35 U.S.C. § 112 are
written description, enablement, and "best mode. '64 Because part of the
content of the prior art; (3) differences between the claimed invention and prior art; and (4)
objective indicia of nonobviousness, including, but not limited to, commercial success of the
invention, "long felt need" for the invention, and success where others have failed. Id.
57.

Graham, 383 U.S. at 15.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
59. See Manson, 383 U.S. at 532-33.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 112(2000).
61. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that
drawings can be sufficient to provide the "written description" of invention).
62. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (holding that an enabling application must contain a general description that enables
one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation).
63. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (e), and (g) (2000) (stating that the "inventor" can file for a
patent). Only the first inventor of a technology can obtain a patent, regardless of whether a later
person filed an earlier application on the same technology, because "inventor" under the Clause
means precisely that (i.e. no such thing as a "second inventor" exists because inventor means the
first person to invent something). See Seidel, supra note 3, at 11; see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 824 (6th Ed. 1990) (giving the definition of "invent," the verb from which the noun
"inventor" derives, as "To find out something new. To devise, contrive, and produce something
not previously known or existing, by the exercise of independent investigation and
experiement[.]").
64. "The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any
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exchange for society is the receipt of information about how the invention
or discovery works and why, lack of meaningful65 disclosure can have
profound effects on the satisfaction of quidpro quo.
The "best mode" requirement necessitates that the patentee not only
provide a description of the invention and how to use it, but that he also
disclose the best mode of practicing or carrying out the invention.
Therefore, of the disclosure requirements, compliance with best mode
extracts the most information from the patentee because, beyond sharing a
description of the invention and explicating it's use, he must disclose his
preferred embodiment of or best way of practicing his invention. Therefore
the best mode disclosure requirement provides an interesting inquiry into
whether the patentee is fulfilling his bargain with the public.
Best mode requires an inventor to disclose his best way of making and
using the claimed66 invention.67 Determining compliance with best mode
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112.
65. Interestingly, the disclosure requirements present more issues for the unpredictable arts,
such as biotechnology, than the predictable arts. In the predictable arts, disclosure of a species is
predictive of and enables a genus. In the unpredictable arts, however, a species does not
necessarily enable the genus. Therefore, disclosure in biotechnology cases is more manipulable,
whereas for software patents satisfaction of disclosure is more certain. See, e.g., Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that patent's
specification did not adequately describe the claimed subject matter because it claimed an entire
genus, but only described one species within the genus, and that species was not necessarily
representative of all species within the genus).
66. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[A]n inventor
need not disclose a mode for obtaining unclaimed subject matter unless the subject matter is
novel and essential for carrying out the best mode of the invention"); Bayer AG v. Schein
Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314-16 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that it is unnecessary to disclose
the best mode of producing elements of an invention which the claims do not cover because
"invention" under section 112 means the invention as defined by the claims). However, there is
contradictory Federal Circuit law on this point and the court's inconsistent stance will be
discussed in more detail infra. See also DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (failure to disclose information about unclaimed subject matter-word processor
preference-satisfied the best mode requirement); Randomex Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585,
589-90 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (disclosure of trade name and not chemical composition of claimed
preferred solution complied with the best mode requirement); Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P'ship, 860
F.2d 415, 418-20 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (failure to disclose an unclaimed surface treatment necessary to
the practice of the invention did not meet the best mode requirement); Spectra Physics, Inc. v.
Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1527 n.2, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (failure to disclose preferred
method relating to unclaimed elements of an invention did not comply with the best mode
requirement); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (step of
invention was not claimed and therefore no disclosure was necessary for best mode compliance:
inventors need not disclose best mode for unclaimed subject matter); Wahl Instruments, Inc v.
Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (under a fact specific balancing test analysis,
routine method of manufacturing a commercial embodiment of invention is not a mode of
carrying out the invention and therefore best mode disclosure is unnecessary).
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disclosure requires both a subjective and an objective inquiry; a patent
application must disclose the subjective best mode in an objectively
enabling way. 68
Compliance with best mode is a question of fact composed of two
subsidiary factual inquiries. "First, the factfinder must determine whether,
at the time of filing the application, the inventor possessed a best mode for
practicing the invention. 6 9
The first prong ...is highly subjective and focuses on the inventor's
state of mind as of the date of filing the application .... Second, if
the inventor subjectively considered one mode to be preferred over
all others, then '[t]he second inquiry is whether the inventor's
disclosure is adequate to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to
practice the best mode of the invention. This inquiry is objective and
depends upon the scope70 of the claimed invention and the level of
skill in the relevant art.'
Best mode disclosure has been a component of our patent system since
Patent Act of 179371 although it was not codified until the Patent Act of
1952,72 or extended to all inventions until 1982.73 Congress did not
delineate a policy behind best mode disclosure so courts have offered the
explanation that best mode exists to prevent inventors' unjust enrichment
without sharing their special knowledge,74 reasoning that the public

67. Note also that to satisfy best mode, the inventor's preference need not necessarily be
labeled as his "best mode," but it must not be buried amid numerous other modes for practicing
the invention either. Randomex, 849 F.2d at 589-90 (failure to distinguish between preferred
embodiment and other claimed embodiments is not a violation of the best mode requirement
when inventor disclosed one other mode).
68.
69.
(quoting
70.

N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Bayer AG & Bayer Corp. v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 963).
Id. (quoting N. Telecom Ltd., 215 F.3d at 1286).

71. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318-323 (repealed 1836). The Patent Act of
1793 contained a provision substantially similar to our modem best mode requirement. See J.
Phillip Anderegg, The Best Mode Requirement of 35 US.C. Section 112, 6 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.
J. 219, 220-21 (1978) (noting that the best mode requirement is traceable to the Patent Act of
1793).
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (and "shall set forth the best mode..
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) (Reviser's Note) (omitting previous clause limiting best mode
coverage to machines and extending applicability to all inventions). See also P. J. Federico,
Commentary, Commentary of the New PatentAct,, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1, 25 (West 1954) ("The clause in
the old statute relating to machine patents and requiring the best mode in such cases has been
omitted as unnecessary and [the current best mode] clause has been added..."); In re Honn, 364 F.
2d 454, 461-62 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1996) (explaining best mode requirement history).
74. Wahl Instruments, Inc v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In In re
Gay, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals asserted that there is only one best mode policy
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benefits from the additional disclosure, and in order to satisfy the basic
75
quidpro quo of patenting, the public is entitled to access the information.
In other words, the best mode requirement serves two purposes: "(1) to
ensure the public receives not merely a disclosure of the invention, but the
best way contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the invention; and
(2) to allow the public to compete fairly with the patentee after the patent
expires. ,,76 These justifications comport with the constitutional aims of
patent protection; according to them, best mode compliance "promote[s]
the progress of ...useful arts ' 7 7 by ensuring that both the patentee and
society benefit sufficiently, but that net benefits accrue for society.
Unfortunately, Federal Circuit7 8 case law on best mode is less than
straight-forward. In the opinion of the author, the court fails to evaluate
best mode compliance in a manner consistent with the policy
considerations. To date, there have been only seven patent cases in which a
patent was or patent claims were held invalid for failure to satisfy the best
mode requirement, 79 even though best mode is the fourth most frequently
requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for
justification: "the sole purpose of this ...
patents while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their
inventions which they have in fact conceived." 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962). But in
Christianson v. Colt Industries. Operating Corp., the Seventh Circuit advanced a different best
mode justification: "the best mode requirement is intended to allow the public to compete fairly
with the patentee following the expiration of the patents." 870 F.2d 1292, 1302 n.8 (7th Cir.
1989). And in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai PharmaceuticalCo., Ltd., the Federal Circuit advanced yet
another justification for best mode: it exists "to ensure that a patent applicant plays 'fair and
square' with the patent system." 927 F.2d 1200, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
75. JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 84-85 (Aspen Publishers 2d
ed. 2006).
76. Jerry R. Selinger, In Defense of "Best Mode ": Preserving the Benefit of the Bargainfor
the Public, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1097 (1994).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
78. This court has been designated to handle all patent-related cases, which has had the
effect of streamlining patent appellate litigation and strengthening the patent right. See Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 37, 37 (1982).
79. See Spectra Physics, 827 F.2d at 1537 (holding a patent covering a gas laser and a patent
covering a method of constructing a gaseous laser invalid for "failure to disclose the best mode
contemplated by the inventors for practicing their... inventions"); Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd.
P'ship, 860 F.2d 415, 420 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent covering a valve stem seal used in internal
combustion engines invalid for failure to disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention); N.
Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (patent for "programmable
processor-based batch data entry terminal" invalid for failure to disclose preferred embodiment);
Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (patent for a dual
durometer grommet invalid for failure to disclose best mode for a claim); U.S. Gypsum Co. v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (patent for lightweight joint
compound used to fill joints during construction invalid for failure to disclose best mode for a
claim); Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(patent covering elongated bar members used to support rolls of materials such as steel or
cellophane invalid for failure to disclose best mode of carrying out invention); and Nobelpharma
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asserted defense during patent litigation. 80 Also, each of these invalidated
patents covered an invention in the predictable arts;8 1 no patent has ever
been invalidated for failure to comply with best mode in biotechnology
patents,82 even though the matter has been often litigated.
The following decisions involve best mode where the claims of the
patent were not held invalid, but where failure to comply arguably existed.
They highlight the Federal Circuit's unwillingness to aggressively enforce
patenting requirements so that the quid pro quo, and therein constitutional
objective, of patenting is realized.
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. BarrLaboratories,83 Eli Lilly obtained patents for
fluoxetine hydrochloride.8 4 Before Eli Lilly's patents expired, Barr
Laboratories filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") under
the Hatch-Waxman Act 85 to begin the process of Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval necessary to market fluoxetine
hydrochloride. 86 Eli Lilly brought an infringement action against Barr
Labs, which Barr Labs affirmatively defended arguing that Eli Lilly's

AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1064-66 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (patent covering
titanium micro-pitted plates used as dental implants invalid for failure to disclose best mode of
carrying out invention). See Bayer AG, 301 F.3d at 1316 (stating that the patents invalidated in
previous cases because of best mode violations involved either "failure to disclose a preferred
embodiment, or else failure to disclose a preference that materially affected making or using the
invention").
80. Brandon Baum, Partner, Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, and Greg Lanier, Partner, Jones
Day, Lecture Notes and Remarks to the Patent Litigation Seminar at U.C. Hastings College of the
Law (Mar. 1, 2007).
81. See Spectra Physics, 827 F.2d at 1526 (patent covering a laser); Dana Corp., 860 F.2d at
416 (patent covering valve stems seals for an internal combustible engine); N. Telecom, 908 F.2d
at 933 (patent covering a mode of batch processing data); Chemcast Corp., 913 F.2d at 924-25
(patent covered a dual durometer grommet); U.S. Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d at 12 10 (patent covering a
"lightweight joint compound"); Great N. Corp., 94 F.3d at 1570-71 (patent covering protective
roll stackers with diamond indentations); and Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1062 (patent covering
bone implant device with rivets).
82. Bayer AG & Bayer Corp. v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
83. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 958.
84. Fluoxetine hydrochloride is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI). Wong DT,
Bymaster FP, Horng JS, Molloy BB, A new selective inhibitorfor uptake of serotonin into
synaptosomes of rat brain: 3-(p-Trifluoromethylphenoxy)-N-methyl-3-phenylpropylamine, J
PHARMACOL ExP THER. 1975 Jun;193(3):804-11. Fluoxetine hydrochloride is also the active
ingredient in the antidepressant Prozac (Lilly 110140). Id.
85. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (1994). The Hatch-Waxman Act permits generic drug
makers to initiate the FDA approval process before the patent on the pioneer drug expires without
infringing on the patent.
86. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 958.
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patents were invalid for lack of disclosure.8 7 Barr argued that Eli Lilly's
best mode of synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol,88 a chemical that is
expensive to buy, cumbersome to produce, but that Eli Lilly's scientists had
discovered a way of synthesizing in "tank car quantities," was not
disclosed. 89 The Federal Circuit held that Eli Lilly was not required to
disclose its preferred method of synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol even
though it was the recommended starting material to produce fluoxetine
hydrochloride and would significantly affect other pharmaceutical
companies' ability to compete upon patent expiration: "[i]n short, the
pnew method
of synthesizing
[the
reasons for using
trifluoromethylphenol] were not linked to the intrinsic quality of fluoxetine
hydrochloride, which is the thrust of the best mode requirement." 90
Barr also challenged the patent's failure to disclose its preferred
solvent used while recrystallizing fluoxetine hydrochloride. The Federal
Circuit held that although additional experimentation was necessary to find
a suitable solvent, Barr and others were able to purify and recrystallize
fluoxetine hydrochloride without disclosing Eli Lilly's preference-in
other words, that a patentee "complies with § 112 even though . . .
experimentation is necessary to practice the best mode" and that section
112 "requires only an adequate disclosure of the best mode." 9 1 Further, the
court stated that "a patentee's failure to disclose an unclaimed, preferred
mode for accomplishing a routine detail does not violate the best mode
requirement because one skilled in the art is aware of alternative means for
detail that would still produce the best mode of
accomplishing the routine
92
the claimed invention."
The holding of this case, in contravention of statutory patent
requirements, essentially provides that to avoid patent invalidity for failure
to disclose a best mode, a patentee need not disclose his entire best mode,
but only portions of it. In other words, a patentee does not need to fully
disclose his best mode to be in accordance with the requirement. This
holding satisfies neither the policy aims behind best mode nor the quidpro
quo of the patent system: society is not fully benefiting from the patentee's
knowledge, and the patentee will retain a competitive advantage in the
marketplace once the patent expires.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 964. P-trifluoromethylphenol is the chemical the patent recommends using as a
starting material when making fluoxetine hydrochloride.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 961.
Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 965.
Id. at 966-67 (quotations and citations omitted).

92. Id. at 966.
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In Amgen Inc. v. Chugai PharmaceuticalCo., Ltd., Amgen alleged

that Chugai infringed its patent covering a method for purifying and
producing erythropoietin ("EPO") and EPO compositions. 93 Among other
defenses, Chugai asserted that Amgen failed to comply with the best mode
requirement because it did not sufficiently disclose the cells necessary to
replicate Amgen's best mode.94
Amgen's best mode of producing EPO involved the use of Chinese
hamster ovary ("CHO") cells that had been transfected 95 so that they would

produce greater amounts of EPO.96 However, Amgen neither made a
deposit 97 of the cells nor disclosed sufficient information to enable Chugai
to create the transfected cell line itself without undue experimentation. In
fact, Chugai could not replicate the level of EPO production Amgen
98
achieved using its own cells.
The district court found that Amgen had a preferred best mode that

involved its transfected cell line, but concluded that even though "the
testimony is clear that no scientist could ever duplicate exactly the best
mode used by Amgen .... those of ordinary skill in the art could produce
mammalian host cell strains or lines with similar levels of production." 99
The Federal Circuit affirmed this conclusion.100

The holding of this case seems to obliterate the best mode
requirement: where a great amount of experimentation is required to
approximate a patentee's best mode, and that experimentation could be
avoided had the patentee disclosed more, that patentee still has not violated

the best mode. By maintaining exclusive control over its transfected cell
line, Amgen retained a benefit that will translate into a commercial benefit
over competitors who will be less efficient at making EPO upon patent
expiration.
93.

Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d at 1204.
94. Id. at 1209.
95. Transfection refers to a biotechnical laboratory technique that introduces foreign genetic
material into a cell's DNA. See, e.g., Bacchetti S and F.L. Graham, Transfer of the gene for
thymidine kinase to thymidine kinase-defcient human cells by purified herpes simplex viralDNA,
PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCi. U.S.A. 1977 Apr; 74(4):1590-94.
96. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1209.
97.

See MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER, JOHN R. THOMAS & HAROLD C.

WEGNER, PATENT LAW 447-48 (Thompson West, 2003) (1998) (informing that the deposit of
biological samples can satisfy the disclosure requirement).
See also Sheryl Rubinstein
Silverstein, Biotechnology Patents and the Deposit Requirement: Removing Uncertainty After
Amgen v. Chugai PharmaceuticalCo., Ltd., 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 937, 937-39 (1993).
98. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1209.
99. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1737, 1772-73, 1742-44
(D. Mass 1989) (emphasis added).
100. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1211.
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In Bayer AG & Bayer Corp. v. Schein Pharmaceuticals,Inc., Dr.
Grohe, a scientist at Bayer, had conceived of the structure of
ciprofloxacin'' but encountered difficulties making the compound.'0 2 He
turned to Bayer scientist Dr. Klauke for help, and they succeeded in
making ciprofloxacin by using an intermediate referred to as the "Klauke
compound," which, although it caused Dr. Grohe significant
trouble to
0 3
make, was his preferred method of producing ciprofloxacin
Dr. Grohe's patent applications' 0 4 for ciprofloxacin did not disclose
the Klauke compound, so, when sued for infringement, Schein attacked the
patent's validity for failure to satisfy best mode. 10 5 The Federal Circuit
held that failure to disclose Grohe's preferred mode did not violate best
mode because the application only needed to disclose the preferred method
of making ciprofloxacin itself and not intermediates required to make
06
ciprofloxacin (and without which Grohe was unable to make the drug).1
Permitting Bayer to retain control over a necessary intermediate
precursor to ciprofloxacin allows Bayer to control others' production so
that competitors are unable to attain equal commercial success upon patent
expiration. As a result, the public suffers higher drug prices from an
unearned monopoly, society has not benefited from the patentee's full
knowledge, and subsequent ciprofloxacin producers will be on unequal
commercial footing with Bayer. In this case, the Federal Circuit seems to
be creating a type of "trade secret/patent" protection that directly
contradicts the overall aims of patent protection. The patentee is retaining

101. Ciprofloxacin is a general antibiotic. See Bayer Health Care Cipro Homepage,
http://www.cipro.com. (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
102. Bayer AG & Bayer Corp. v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1309 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
103. Id.
104. Dr. Grohe filed patent applications claiming ciprofloxacin in several foreign countries.
Id. at 1313. However, Grohe did not disclose the Klauke compound in any of these applications.
Id. Under 35 U.S.C. § 119 (2000 & Supp. V.2005), a patentee is entitled to use foreign filing
dates as priority dates in the United States in order to avoid prior art, however, if an applicant
fails to disclose his best mode in any foreign application, that application cannot serve as the
filing date for an application in the U.S. because it does not comply with U.S. patent laws. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 112, 119 (2000 & Supp. V.2005).
105. BayerAG, 301 F.3d at 1313-14.
106. Id. at 1314, 1323. The Federal Circuit held that disclosing the method of making only
ciprofloxacin from intermediaries derived from the Klauke compound (that Grohe was unable to
make without using the Klauke compound) was sufficient disclosure because "the [patent]
application containled] an enabling disclosure of [the necessary intermediate]. Schein merely
contend[ed] that this [wa]s not enough, that the application must disclose Dr. Grohe's preferred
method of making [the intermediate]. But, because that preference does not materially affect
carrying out the invention, ciprofloxacin, it need not be disclosed to comply with the best mode
requirement." Id. at 1323.
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secrets about his invention, and yet is excluding others from practicing it.
The Federal Circuit's management of best mode disclosure has been
widely criticized and many have advocated altering the requirement
because of its poor treatment. 1 7 These cases and criticisms make apparent
107. Christopher Marchese criticizes the current best mode requirement, which has produced
an increasing volume of litigation in the last thirty-five years and raised many questions for
prosecutors and litigators, and encourages a very specific reform that the Federal Circuit itself
could perform.
Christopher S. Marchese, Confusion, Uncertainty, and the Best Mode
Requirement, 2 FED. CIR. B.J., Spring 1992, at 65 (1992); Christopher S. Marchese, Promoting
the Progressof the Useful Arts by Narrowing Best Mode DisclosureRequirements in PatentLaw,
54 U. PITT. L. REv. 589, 590-92 (1992-93). He argues that the Federal Circuit "has clouded the
scope of disclosure" and its case law fails to resolve the issue of "whether inventors must disclose
their preferred modes of carrying out unclaimed subject matter. Id. at 609 (emphasis in original).
This issue has three possible resolutions: (1) compel inventors to reveal their best mode only for
claimed subject matter; (2) require that inventors disclose all preferred modes, or (3) determine
the significance of any preferred mode, and only find a best mode violation where a "material
mode" was withheld. Id. Marchese concludes that the first resolution would be the best. Id. at
660. It is a clear standard and therefore promotes efficiency and reliance on the patent system
(thereby promoting the useful arts), prevents trapping patent applicants because of their
disclosures, and simplifies the already daunting patent process. Id.
Albert L. Jacobs, Jr. offers a more feasible, yet similarly minor, reform. Albert L.
Jacobs, Jr., The Best Mode Requirement: What the Law Is and What It Should Be, 16 HOuS. J.
INT'L L. 533, 535 (1994). Jacobs highlights some troublesome district and state court patent
decisions and addresses international issues with the best mode requirement and arrives at the
conclusion that although the best mode requirement is problematic, it would not be were it
applied as intended: "[d]eleting the best mode requirement would be unnecessary if the
requirement were applied in a reasonable and logical manner to give effect to the clear intent of
the statute. Namely, to ensure that when an inventor chooses to file a patent application in an
attempt to secure a temporary monopoly on the invention, he makes a full and complete
disclosure, including any best or preferred mode of carrying out his invention." Id. at 563. This,
he argues, will advance the Constitutional aims of patent protection, because it will ensure that
the applicant does not intentionally conceal or suppress his preferred mode. Id.
Donald S. Chisum focuses on concerns arising from violations of best mode and
inequitable conduct issues, proposing a very convincing suggestion that we alter best mode filing
requirements by permitting applicants to modify their preferred embodiments throughout the life
of a patent, therein giving the public the best possible disclosure (as later-developed best modes
can be more sophisticated or efficacious). Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and
Inequitable Conduct in Patent Procurement: A Nutshell, A Review of Recent Federal Circuit
Cases and a Pleafor Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 31819 (1997). After summarizing several Federal Circuit decisions involving best mode, he
concludes that the requirement has "strong positive and negative effects on the patent system."
Id. at 318. He dispenses with the suggestion of "completely review[ing] and revis[ing]" the best
mode requirement, and argues instead to revise the timing element of the requirement, "for best
mode compliance seem[s] to be needless and deleteriously rigid." Id. He explains that relaxing
and extending the timing requirement so that the inventor may add or alter best mode disclosures
made upon filing would benefit the public: later developed modes "are typically more
sophisticated and developed than earlier ones," so an applicant would be in a better position after
assessing the commercial viability of an invention to determine whether more disclosure would
be necessary; and inventors could adopt others' improvements or commercial adaptations on the
invention, and disclose those officially to the public. Id. at 319.
Tressa James argues that because attorneys employ the best mode defense as a way of
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the Federal Circuit's lack of strict best mode disclosure enforcement and its
unwillingness to invalidate a patent for best mode transgressions, especially
in the biotechnology context. This tendency is particularly problematic
because it establishes stronger patents based on more lenient patenting
requirements, which invalidates the quidpro quo between the patentee and
society. Further, the Patent Reform Act of 2005 proposes to eliminate the
best mode requirement entirely in order to harmonize international patent
systems, which will cement the lowered disclosure and its negative effects
into law. 10 8 If these disclosure requirements are undermined, our patent
system may slowly morph into an unconstitutional and restrictive system.
B.

Non-Obviousness

Obviousness is the most significant gatekeeper to patentability.' 0 9 It
involves several difficult determinations because it includes a "series of
factual assessments culminating in an often-difficult qualitative judgment
of the creative achievement involved in the invention" as a whole. 110

avoiding technical points at issue in a patent infringement suit (they focus on the subjective
mindset of the inventor and "try the person, not the patent"), it enables the judge to assess the
inventor as a person, allowing the judge "a window through which [the judge] can express [his or
her] unique views on patent law and assess the moral culpability of the inventor." James, supra
note 7, at 98-100. Therefore, the presence of the best mode requirement frees judges to impress
their subjective and personal views onto an invention, rendering best mode decisions "highly
subjective and open to the individual philosophy of the judge in question." Id. at 136-37.
Interestingly, a review of patent invalidity cases from late 1980 to early 1990 revealed that federal
judges handled best mode cases dissimilarly but in accordance with their backgrounds and
experiences: "Specifically, judges with patent experience rejected best mode arguments 74.1% of
the time, while judges without patent experience rejected best mode arguments only 61.5% of the
time," indicating that best mode is highly subjective analysis which the judges need to be careful
about when making decisions. Id. at 136.
Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit has criticized the existence of the best mode
requirement and suggests its removal because no sane inventor would risk suppressing his best
mode because then it would not be patentable. See Bayer AG, 301 F.3d at 1323-28 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
I believe that failing to rigorously require best mode compliance violates the quid pro
quo behind patenting because the public does not benefit fully from the inventor's knowledge. I
also think that inventors should under no circumstances be permitted to retain information that
will give them a commercial advantage upon the expiration of the patent term because this
continues a patentee's monopoly beyond the sanctioned period, and injures the public who will
suffer higher drug costs and insurance premiums as a result. Therefore, I suggest that the courts
employ a two-prong test that mirrors the dual policy objectives behind best mode when
determining compliance to see (1)whether the inventor enabled the preferred embodiment of the
invention, (2) in a way that guarantees the public an end to the governmental protection upon
expiration of the patent.
108. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
109. ADELMAN, supra note 97, at 309.
110. Id.
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Obviousness is intended to be "the standard that prevents trivial advances
in the useful arts from winning patent protection."' 1 It achieves this
objective by "creat[ing] a 'patent-free' zone around the state of the art,"
allowing substitutions and improvements on patented products "only where
a claimed invention surpasses this ordinary, continuous flow of technical
progress.',, 12 Obviousness is measured at the time the invention was made,
which creates a "hindsight" issue for the examiner who has to make the
obviousness determination from the point of view of "a person having
11 3
ordinary skill in the art" of the invention at the time of the invention.
Obviousness developed as judge-made doctrine, 14 and was not
codified until 1952.' 15 The old test asked whether there was a "flash of
creative genius" sufficient to warrant a patent. 1 6 In Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, the case that established this historical standard of invention,
17
the Supreme Court invalidated a patent on a doorknob made from clay.'
The Court held that a patent will not be held valid if it consists merely of
improving an old device by the substitution of materials better suited to the
purpose of the device: "[i]n other words, the improvement
is the work of
8
the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor.""
The Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. interpreted the thenrecently passed non-obviousness statutory requirements to overrule the
high "flash of creative genius" standard. 1' 9 The Court established the
current lower non-obviousness inquiry as a question of law that is based on
' 20
an underlying multi-step factual inquiry known as the "Graham factors."'
111.
112.

Id. at310.
Id.

113. Id.
114. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 270 (1850). Some refer to this decision as an
example of judicial activism because there was no support for the development of a standard of
non-obviousness in either the Patent Act or the Constitution. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The
Hotchkiss Unobviousness Standard: Early Judicial Activism in the Patent Law, 13 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 103, 126-28 (2005).
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000 & Supp. V.2005). Section 103(a) is the primary nonobviousness section (providing that "[a] patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made"). 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000 & Supp. V.2005).
116. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90 (1941) (employing the
test from Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 270).

117.
118.
119.
120.

Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 264.
Id. at 267.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
Id.
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The "Graham Factors" constitute the following four factors that the Court
held to be essential to every non-obviousness analysis: (1) level of ordinary
skill in the art; (2) scope and content of prior art; (3) differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art; and, (4) secondary considerations
which may be relevant to establishing the background upon which
the
121
invention was introduced (i.e., objective indicia of nonobviousness).
The Supreme Court again spoke on obviousness in Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc., reasserting its holding in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,
which stated that "[a] patent for a combination which only unites old
12 2
elements with no change in their respective functions" is not patentable.
In its 2007 decision Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR International Company, the
Supreme Court yet again addressed obviousness standards, and appeared to
buttress a heightened, yet subjective, obviousness standard 23
that the Federal
Circuit had seemed intent upon eroding since its inception.'
There is evidence of the Federal Circuit's wear upon the standard in
several decisions. In Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
decided after Graham but before Teleflex, the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's finding of invalidity due to obviousness. 24 In upholding the
patent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had given
insufficient weight to the "secondary considerations" Graham factor:
"objective evidence such as commercial success, failure of others, long-felt
need, and unexpected results must be considered before a conclusion on
obviousness is reached[.]"' 25 This holding is not in direct conflict with
Graham, yet it and the Federal Circuit's in-depth consideration of these
secondary factors place undue emphasis on "secondary considerations,"
26
which were intended to be, as their name indicates, secondary.1
The Court in Graham established that
[u]nder § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art resolved.
Against this background, the obviousness or

121. Id. at 17-18.
122. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281 (1976) (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)).
123. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., From Lexis: 127 S.Ct. 1727*, 1734-35; 167 L. Ed. 2d
705, 715; 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4745, 18-19 (2007). *All pagination subject to change pending
releaseoffinal published version.
124. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
125.

Id. at 1380 (emphasis in original).

126.

See id. at 1382-1385.
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nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.

The Court then stated that "[s]uch secondary considerations as commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be
utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented" and that "[a]s indicia of obviousness
or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy."' 28 The Court in
Graham listed the first three requirements in an obviousness determination,
129
whereas the secondary considerations "may" or "might" be considered.
Compare this to Hybritech, where the Federal Circuit criticized the district
court for not fully taking the "secondary considerations" into account
before making a finding of obviousness, which the Federal Circuit then
reversed in light of the "secondary considerations."'' 30 The Federal Circuit
in Hybritech placed an emphasis on the Graham factors that is not reflected
in the Supreme Court's decision and that aids findings and holdings of nonobviousness.
In In re Deuel, the Federal Circuit again lowered the patentability
standards, making it easier to establish nonobviousness.13 ' The Federal
Circuit reiterated its previous holding in In re Bell by asserting that "the
PTO's focus on known methods for potentially isolating the claimed DNA
molecules is also misplaced because the claims at issue define compounds,
not methods."'' 32 Therefore "even if ...the existence of general cloning
techniques, coupled with knowledge of a protein's structure, might have
provided motivation to prepare a cDNA or made it obvious to prepare a
cDNA, that does not necessarily make obvious a particular claimed
cDNA.' ' 33 This Federal Circuit language created a per se rule for patenting
34
DNA: any new DNA structures are nonobvious and therefore patentable. 1
The Federal Circuit also expanded the scope of nonobviousness
through its consideration of prior art references. Section 103(a) of the
Patent Act establishes that prior art indicates obviousness "if the

127. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,17 (1966).
128. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380.
131. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
132. Id. (referring to In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993), which held that the
PTO erred in resting a rejection upon the combination of a primary reference disclosing a protein
with a secondary reference describing a general method of cloning genes: "the PTO's focus on
Bell's method is misplaced. Bell does not claim a method. Bell claims compositions, and the issue
is the obviousness of the claimed compositions, not of the method by which they are made").
133. In reDeuel,51 F.3d at 1559.
134. Id.
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differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains.' 35 More than one prior art reference
can be combined to establish obviousness, however, it is impermissible for
evaluators with the knowledge of the invention to pick and choose from the
range of prior art references to build a case of obviousness. 3 6 Rather, there
must be a "teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine" the references
in the way that would make the invention obvious. 137 This new "teachingsuggestion-motivation test" ("TSM test") permitted the combination of
prior art references for obviousness determinations when there is some
motivation, suggestion, or teaching to combine the prior art and supplanted
all Supreme Court obviousness precedent at that time.' 38
Recently, in a series of unpublished decisions, the Federal Circuit
expanded its test even further. The Federal Circuit began to require an
express suggestion in the prior art to combine the prior art references. This
measure significantly deviated from the statutory and precedential standard.
As John Duffy noted:
[The Federal Circuit's suggestion] test, which tends to make even
seemingly trivial developments patentable, is entirely the Federal
Circuit's product. It has no basis in the Supreme Court's case law
and may, in fact, be inconsistent with the Court's most recent
pronouncement on the subject (though that precedent is now more
than a quarter century old).
After permitting the Federal Circuit to continue to erode obviousness
standards for twenty years, the Supreme Court belatedly, but finally,
stepped in when it decided the much-anticipated Teleflex. 140 Teleflex
involved claim 4 of U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 ("the '565 patent"). Claim 4
recited a device that mounted a modular sensor onto a fixed pivot point on
a specialized adjustable vehicle control pedal, such that the result was

135. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2007).
136. See MUELLER, supra note 75, at 190.
137. Id. (explaining that "if the references themselves or other prior art do not suggest the
viability of making the combination [of the references], it is a legally erroneous analysis").
138. Id. at 190-91.
However, this test is still unable to surmount the considerable
difficulties presented by the hindsight issue.
139. John Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 340-41 (2002).
140. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., From Lexis: 127 S. Ct. 1727*, 1734-35; 167 L. Ed. 2d
705, 715; 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4745, 18-19 (2007) *All pagination subject to change pending
release offinalpublished version.
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novel, but the comprising elements were not. 14 1 In the lower courts, the
Federal Circuit applied its loose obviousness standard to reverse the district
court's finding of obviousness.1 42 The Supreme Court then reversed the
Federal Circuit, and invalidated the patent claim. 43 Although much debate
surrounds the meaning and effect of the decision, the Supreme Court
rebuked the Federal Circuit and proclaimed that there is no clear test for
obviousness, 144 but rather it is a subjective inquiry that employs common
sense and depends on the objective reach of the patent claims,
thus
45
invalidating the Federal Circuit's TSM or express suggestion test.
Although the reach and effect of Teleflex is currently unknown,
perhaps it will serve as a final corrective to the Federal Circuit's previous
unwillingness to invalidate a patent claim for lack of non-obviousness.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's strong language, although dicta, that
"the results of ordinary invention are not the subject of exclusive rights
under patent laws" because "were it otherwise patents might stifle, rather
than promote, the progress of useful arts[,]" is encouraging.146 Yet the
Federal Circuit had previous Supreme Court precedent to follow, and
nevertheless ended up creating its own extremely lenient test.
Obviousness determinations permit great flexibility to those
evaluating the validity of patent claims because the factors are myriad, the
standard is not concrete, the determination is challenging, and it is difficult
to objectively conclude whether a person having ordinary skill in the art at
the time the invention was created would think the invention obvious. As
Judge Learned Hand commented, the test of invention "is as fugitive,
impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole
paraphernalia of legal concepts."' 147 Even so, the determination of
inventiveness is obviousness, and inventiveness is the heart of patenting.
Courts and examiners should therefore be exceedingly strict in performing
the non-obviousness inquiry in order to uphold the quid pro quo of
patenting and enforce the constitutional objectives of the Clause.

141. Id. at 1736-37; Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 289 F.Supp.2d 581, 586-87 (E.D.Mich
2003).
142. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282, 283 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
143. Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1753.
144. Id. at 1741 ("The flaws in the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate for the most part
to the court's narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry reflected in its application of the
TSM test.").
145. Id. ("When a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the
obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.").
146. Id. at 1746.
147. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).

Winter 2008]

C.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

245

Utility

The way the Federal Circuit has treated the utility requirement raises
similar issues. Under the current statutory provisions, a patentable
invention must be "new and useful."' 148 The utility requirement is explicit
in the constitutional language that requires Congress to act "to promote the
progress of... useful Arts" 14 9 and has been a component of patent law
since the first Patent Act of 1793.50 Utility dovetails with enablement:
without utility, an invention cannot be enabled so that others can use it
without undue experimentation. The utility requirement, however, is rarely
invoked during prosecution or litigation15 ' perhaps because the Federal
Circuit has established a low standard for measuring utility.' 52 However,
this was not always the case.
Utility used to have a moral component. In 1817 Justice Story
proscribed patents on inventions that were "injurious to the well-being,
good policy, or sound morals of society," such as "a new invention to
poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination."'1 53 This proposition continues to appear as precedent
adopted and enforced by the Federal Circuit. 54 However, in the 1999 case
Juicy Whip, Inc., v. Orange Bang, Inc., citing on a decision from the Board
of Patent Appeals, the Federal Circuit announced that morality was no
longer a factor in a utility patenting determination. 55 Not only should the
Federal Circuit not be relying on lower courts that have ignored Supreme
Court precedent, but this ruling also fails to take into account the 1991

148. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. V.2005).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
150. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (requiring an invention to be
sufficiently useful and important to warrant the issuance of a patent).
151. Brandon Baum, Partner, Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, Remarks to the Patent Litigation
Seminar at Hastings, College of the Law (Mar. 1, 2007).
152. See Juicy Whip, Inc., v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(providing that "[t]he threshold of utility is not high: [a]n invention is 'useful' under section 101
if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit").
153. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (cited and
incorporated into Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532-33 (1966).
154. See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d
1546, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178-79 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
155. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366-1367 ("the principle that inventions are invalid if they are
principally designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly in recent
years. For example, years ago courts invalidated patents on gambling devices on the ground that
they were immoral ... but that is no longer the law." (citing Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512
(7th Cir. 1922)); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1897); National Automatic Device Co. v.
Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1889), but that is no longer the law, see In re Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 801 (PTO Bd. App. 1977)").

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 35:2

157
Federal Circuit decision relying on Lowell v. Lewis (by citing a case 58
that incorporates it) stating that morality continues to be a consideration.
The Supreme Court again spoke on utility in 1966 when it decided
Brenner v. Manson.159 In the context of an interference action160 the Court
characterized the actions of patentee Manson as an attempt to receive a
patent on a novel chemical compound (for which he cited possible antitumor capabilities by analogizing its structure and composition to a known
anti-tumor agent) so that he could proceed to determine useful applications
for the novel compound without threats of competition and possible
preemption.16' The Court held that Manson's actions subverted the patent
system, which seeks to award "compensation for [the search's] successful
conclusion" rather than the search itself. 62 This analysis, as Justice
Harlan
63
utility.'
determining
for
standard
high
a
establishes
out,
pointed
Yet in 1995, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower courts' findings of
patent invalidity for failure to satisfy the utility requirement in a case
highly similar to Brenner.164 In In re Brana the patentee disclosed that the
newly discovered compound was useful in the "treatment of diseases" and
as an "antitumor substance[]," but offered no other express utility such as
against what diseases it was effective or how it would function as an antitumor agent.' 65 Although it is unclear how a person having ordinary skill
in the art would successfully use the chemical to "treat diseases," the
Federal Circuit held that sufficient utility had been established to uphold
the patent, even in light of the Supreme Court's treatment of Manson's
"anti-tumor" utility disclosure.
In re Brana is, therefore, apparently in direct conflict with Supreme
156

156. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
157. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 178-79 (citing Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019).
158. See Tol-O-Matic v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschafl, 945 F.2d 1546, 1552-53
(1991).
159. Brenner v Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1966) (stating that "a patent is not a hunting
license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion").
160. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(l) (2000 & Supp. V.2005). An inventor can request an
"interference action" involving determination ofinventorship when inventorship is disputed.
161. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 522, 536 (1966). The chemical compound was exceedingly
similar to a known anti-tumor agent. Manson alleged anti-tumor capabilities as the utility,
although he had not proven if and how the chemical would function in this way except through
analogy to similar known anti-tumor chemicals. Seeking to get a patent so he would have
exclusive license to work on his newly discovered chemical, the Court responded that a patent is
"not a hunting license." Id.
162. Id.
163.
164.

Id. at 536-37. (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In reBrana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

165.

Id. at 1565.
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Court precedent that holds a patent is not a "hunting license" that rewards
' 166
patentees for the search, but not for the search's "successful conclusion."
Although the Supreme Court prevented Manson from performing such a
search, the Federal Circuit essentially gave Brana free reign to search for
myriad applications for his novel compound without the threat of
competition or preemption. In both Juicy Whip and In re Brana, the
Federal Circuit deviated from precedent and narrowed the utility
requirement to which patentees must adhere. The result is that the courts
now uphold patent claims that would not have satisfied previously required
standards. This means that patentees are getting more for doing less, which
is to society's detriment. This frustrates the quid pro quo of the patent
system as well as the constitutional requirement to promote the progress of
the useful arts.
D.

First-to-Invent Filing System

Currently the U.S. patent system follows a "first-to-invent" filing
system. 67 First-to-invent filing allows only the first inventor to receive a
patent, and therefore rewards the true inventor for his personal
contribution.1 68 By rewarding the person who in fact performed the
inventive activity (the inventor himself), first-to-invent filing reinforces the
incentives offered by the patent system by encouraging people to invent
rather than copy, because the copier of an invention will not receive a
patent. 169
The first-to-invent system is generally considered to benefit small
inventors. 170

Also, many of the previous inefficiencies 171 caused by the

duplicative research efforts by researchers unaware of a pending patent on
their research have been resolved by the practice of publishing pending

166. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536.
167. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (e), (g) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005) (stating the inventor can file
for a patent). The patent system has always enforced first-to-invent filing. See Patent Act of
1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (providing patentability requirements for the inventor). Only
the first inventor of a technology can obtain a patent, regardless of whether a later inventor filed
an earlier application on the same technology. This implicates novelty requirements, which are a
basic element of our "first to invent" patent system.
168. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (e), (g) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005). Each of these provisions uses
the word "inventor" such that only the inventor of a technology can obtain a patent, regardless of
whether a later developer filed an earlier application on the same technology. See supra note 63.
169. MUELLER, supra note 75, at 26-29.
170. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
171. The major criticism of the first-to-invent system is that it is inefficient. See Charles R.
B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard in Patent Law
Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193, 218 (1990).
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patent applications. 72
Additionally Congress created interference
proceedings173 to correctly resolve disputes when two parties assert the
same first-inventorship. The first-to-invent system is criticized for being
inefficient because of interference proceedings, however, a first-to-invent
system does not need to retain such74proceedings in order to ensure the
integrity of its first-to-invent system. 1
Pending 2005 legislation in Congress proposes to change this system
into a "first-to-file" 175 system, whereby the inventor who "races to the
patent office" first receives the patent.176 Switching to a first-to-file system
would harmonize U.S. practices with international patent application
practices.177 However, if adopted, it may undermine the quid pro quo
behind patenting and may
create a system that less closely adheres to the
78
constitutional mandate.'
For example, the first-to-file system does not reward the "first and
true" inventor, 179 but rather the inventor who can file the soonest.
Similarly, the first-to-file system has been characterized as unfair for
prejudicing the independent inventor with fewer resources and limited
capacity to win the race to the patent office.180 Also, "[s]witching to a first-

172. The passage of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 established that patent
applications would be published eighteen months after filing. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(l) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005).
174. See MUELLER, supra note 75, at 434-37. See also Edward Walterscheid, Priority of
Invention: How the United States Came to Have a "First-to-Invent"Patent System, 23 AIPLA
Q.J. 263 (1995) (noting that England had a first-to-invent patenting system and offered no such
proceeding to determine inventorship but rather relied on the relative filing dates, among other
things, as indications of the date of invention).
175. Technically it self-refers as a "first-inventor-to-file" system, but this is merely a
difference of semantics: there is no qualitative difference between it and a "first-to-file" system.
See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
176. Id.
177. MUELLER, supra note 75, at 434-35.
178. In addition to frustrating the promotion of "the progress of science and the useful arts,"
some argue that adopting a first-to-file system would offend the Clause because it specifically
refers to "inventor" rather than "first-filer." Macedo, supra note 171, at 210-15. However, the
Supreme Court has broadly interpreted Congress' powers to act under the Clause, and only limits
Congress' legislation to promoting "the progress of science and the useful arts." Id. at 215.
Therefore, because of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Congress' power under the
Act, a first-to-file system that grants patents to those other than the actual "inventor" as stated by
the Clause will likely survive a direct constitutionality attack. Id. However, it is nevertheless
possible that a first-to-file system would not "promote the progress of science and the useful arts"
and therefore be unconstitutional.
179. To be an inventor according to patent law and the Constitution is "to discover or produce
something not made before, i.e. new; and an invention [i]s
something new that c[an] also be
referred to as a discovery." Seidel, supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis in original).
180.

MUELLER, supra note 75, at 435.
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to-file system would result in a decline in the quality of applicants because
of hasty filings, as well as the filing of the applications containing less
experimental data[,]" and "would result in the filing of a large number of
applications which would otherwise not be filed."''
Additionally, changing to a first-to-file system risks incentivizing
duplicative research efforts, which introduces inefficiency; if researcher B
learns about researcher A's novel and possibly lucrative project, B has an
incentive to abandon his own work, copy A's research, and file the patent
application before A so that B can get the patent.
A first-to-file system also creates an incentive for more secrecy during
research and development; because conception, diligence and reduction to
practice would no longer be sufficient to get a patent-because the only
relevant date will become the filing date-researchers will be covert about
their research. They will be unwilling to discuss ideas openly or share
thoughts or results for fear someone will co-opt their work. Academic
research depends on, and flourishes with, this exchange of ideas. Adopting
the first-to-file system threatens this integral idea of sharing that promotes
science and knowledge.
E.

Experimental Use
Patent law contains certain limitations on a patentee's right to exclude
others from practicing his invention. 182 These limitations include the
experimental use exception, which provides that a patentee cannot exclude
someone from using his patent if the other is using the patent "solely for
research, academic or experimental purposes."' 183 The Framers did not
contemplate the experimental use exception, and, unlike in other
countries, 184 the exception is not codified. 185 The exception is judge-made
doctrine established by Justice Story in an 1813 case.186 Subsequent courts
181. Donald R. Dunner, First to File: Should Our Interference System Be Abolished?, 68 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 561, 563-64 (1986) (arguing additionally that interference
proceedings as we currently have them are not necessary).
182.

See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03 (2006).
183. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425 (M.D.N.C. 2001); Deuterium Corp. v.
United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 624, 630 (1990).
184. MUELLER, supra note 75, at 336 n. 37 (detailing codified experimental use exceptions in
French, German, English, and Japanese patent systems).
185. Id. at 336-37 (noting that pursuant to preparing and filing an Abbreviated New Drug
Application ("ANDA") there is a limited experimental use exception for drugs in U.S. patent law,
but no other provision is codified).
186. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (stating
that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed
such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects").
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have reiterated that it is "now well settled, that an experiment with a
patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or
curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the
patentee"'' 8 7 because it was not possible to show "injury and damage"
required for infringement.188
Although there is significant scholarly discussion on the experimental
use exception,' 89 the Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke University190 altered
general conception about the extent and application of the experimental use
exception. 191
Duke University hired plaintiff Madey away from Stanford to become
the director of a nuclear physics lab. 92 Shortly thereafter, he was asked to
step down as lab director and left Duke. 193 Madey practiced three of his
patents in his research at Duke, and, after he left, researchers continued to
practice his patents despite his objections. 194 Madey sued Duke for patent
infringement, Duke sought refuge under the experimental use exception,
and then moved for summary judgment. 95 The district court held that
Duke's actions did not show "intent [to] benefit commercially" from the
patents, and granted Duke's motion for summary judgment. 96 The Federal
Circuit reversed, holding:
Our precedent clearly does not immunize use that is in any way
commercial in nature. Similarly, our precedent does not immunize
any conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate
business, regardless of commercial implications. For example, major
research universities, such as Duke, often sanction and fund research
projects with arguably no commercial application whatsoever.
However, these projects unmistakably further the institution's
187.

Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).

188. Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (C.C. Mass. 1852) (No. 2,262); see Whittemore, 29
F. Cas. at 1121.
189. See CHISUM, supra note 182, § 16.03 (2006) (providing an extensive and comprehensive
overview). See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1018-20 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No
"Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
BiomedicalResearch Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1, 17 (2001).
190. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1352, 1361-63, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
191. See generally Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from the
United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implicationsfor University and Nonprofit Research
and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 917 (2004).
192. Madey, 307 F.3dat 1352.
193.

Id.

194. Id. at 1353.
195. Id.
196. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
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legitimate business objectives, including educating and enlightening
students and faculty participating in these projects. These projects
also serve, for example, to increase the status of the institution and
lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty.
In short, regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is

engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in
furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not

solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow
the profit or
and strictly limited experimental use defense. Moreover,
197
non-profit status of the user is not determinative.

This strict language from the Federal Circuit effectively debars any
functional or large-scale application of the experimental use exception.'"
Universities and non-profits require funding to exist, which, according
to the logic of the Federal Circuit, means that everything that happens
within these organizations is "business." However, a university's main
"business" is the very progress in science and the useful arts that the
Constitution sought to promote. Patents should serve as a supplement to

the spontaneously engaged-upon research of university scientists, not as a
competition device or as an impediment to research. The Federal Circuit
has unnecessarily restricted the experimental use exception, and the court
seemed to indicate that no feasible use of any patent could ever be

characterized as experimental, not even in a research university setting.
Yet again, this shows the Federal Court's unwillingness to question patent
scope for the purpose of facilitating research and knowledge. This is
perhaps the most blatant example of the Federal Circuit ruling so as not to
promote the progress of science.

197. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
198. This decision by the Federal Circuit could be considered the logical extension of the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-214 (2000 & Supp. V. 2005), which authorizes and
encourages federally funded institutions and research projects to seek patents and participate in
"patent commerce." Given that researchers performing basic science research (as opposed to
applied science research) are participating in this "patent commerce," it would be difficult for the
Federal Circuit to decide the other way and protect basic science research institutions from
attaining licenses or paying royalties when they could eventually parlay that knowledge into a
patent. Also, to establish a procedure for post-grant compulsory licensing when research with
others' patents yields a patentable invention would be prohibitively complicated, messy and
difficult to enforce. Certain scientists and researchers could sign agreements binding them to
never seek a patent regardless of the fruits of their research efforts, which would therefore
sufficiently distance them from "patent commerce." However, the Federal Circuit did not limit
its decision to "patent commerce" but rather found a commercial value in contributing to the
image of a university. Therefore, while the argument can be made that this decision is the logical
fallout of the Bayh-Dole Act over which the Federal Circuit had no control, the Federal Circuit
could have used a finer tool to draw these lines.
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F. Summary
Each of these elements of patent law (disclosure, obviousness, utility,
first-to-invent filing, experimental use) has one thing in common: each
represents a focus on the economics of patenting rather than a focus on the
science, research and knowledge that patenting is supposed to encourage.
The proposed removal of best mode and change from first-to-invent to
first-to-file are efforts to harmonize the United States patent system with
international systems. Harmonization means that it will be easier for
foreign applicants to avail themselves of the U.S. patent system and for
U.S. patentees to exploit their inventions in foreign markets. Yet both of
these changes fail to consider the implications for promoting the progress
of science. Obviousness can be discounted if the invention has economic
success. Similarly, utility is turning into an economic analysis: if a patent
can be exploited, the Federal Circuit seems to assume utility.199 While
economic desirability undoubtedly establishes utility of a sort, the Framers
did not intend mere economic utility to be the measure for patentability.
Finally, experimental use is essentially no longer available to academia,
because universities are considered too involved in commerce to receive
protection for activities that occur in their research laboratories.
Economic concerns are a part of the incentive inherent in the patent
right. Economic incentives make the patenting system function by making
the procurement of a patent a goal and a palpable reward of research
efforts. However, economic considerations currently seem to play too
significant a role in the patent system; they are eclipsing the constitutional
aims of promoting the progress of the useful arts. Patenting may be too
focused on promoting economic benefits and not enough on the progress of
science.
These examples, although merely vignettes within the complex
patenting process, illustrate shifts away from the constitutional idea of
patentability. There is a noticeable trend away from considering patents in
terms of the constitutional objectives of the Clause. Whether this is merely
Congress and the courts nibbling around the edges of the constitutional
directive, or whether it represents a movement toward fiercely aligning
scientific research and economics in contravention of concerns for
promoting knowledge, is unknown. However, there appears a need for
awareness, if not concern, for how the patent system is performing today.

199. See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995). (applicant's favorable
comparison of the functioning of its anti-tumor agent to other anti-tumor agents currently in-use
is sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement).
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V. Effects and Solutions
Patent law is drifting from its constitutional anchor, which results in
an out-of-balance patent system. The net benefit to society is diminished,
patents are upheld that have been over-issued and under-deserved, and
patents have become exceedingly robust, making it nearly impossible to
invalidate their claims.2 °0 While the recent trend might turn out to be just
that, simply reflecting the ebb and flow of the governmental interface with
commercial enterprise, the recent proliferation of suggested reforms in light
of the shifting role of the patent system suggests otherwise.
Many critics have written extensively suggesting reforms to the patent
system. Similarly, congresspersons have introduced legislation to change
the system, and several agencies have conducted studies assessing whether
action is necessary. 2° 1 Nevertheless, the U.S. patent system is a complex
and integrated body of judicial, statutory, and constitutional law and
impacts governmental agencies, industry, and millions of patentees.
Proposed changes, several of which are surveyed below, must therefore be

measured and thoughtful.
Authors Heller and Eisenberg published an article asking whether

patents can deter innovation, specifically warning of the "tragedy of the
anticommons"

occurring

in patent

law.20 2

The

"tragedy

of the

anticommons" is the antithesis of the social and evolutionary phenomenon
"the tragedy of the commons."20 3 It results from having too many patents
200. This is both good and bad: it permits stability in the patent system, which means that
more people will rely on it, and it may foster innovation and development. However, many
patents issue that are not deserved. Because of this, a stronger patent right means that patents that
never should have issued are filling up research space and contributing to the "patent thicket."
This ultimately discourages research and innovation-the tragedy of the anticommons-and they
do not necessarily fulfill to society the benefit of the bargain. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698, 701 (1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/280/5364/698.pdf.
201. See, e.g., H.R. 34, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007); FTC Report,
supra note 46; Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy,
National Research Council, A Patent System for the 21 st Century (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C.
Levin, & Mark B. Myers, eds., 2004), available at http://books.nap.edu/html/patentsysten/
0309089107.pdf [hereinafter NRC Report]; Stephen Hansen, et al., American Association for the
Advancement of Science, The Effects of Patenting in the AAAS Scientific Community (2d ed.
2006), available at http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/AAAS-IP-Survey-Report.pdf [hereinafter AAAS
Report].
202. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 200, at 698.
203. The "tragedy of the commons" theory espouses that resources that are commonly
owned and generally available will be overused, depleted and then exhausted. Observance of the
social phenomenon, currently most often applied to evolutionary, developmental, and behavioral
biology, can be traced to Aristotle, although Garret Hardin popularized the theory in 1968. Garret
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) available at
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issued on certain technologies so that everyone is prevented from using the
new discovery or invention because of the overlapping rights to exclude.
20 4
This results in the discoveries and innovations becoming "underused.,
Heller and Eisenberg suggest that where previously a discoverer or
inventor would have felt entitled to co-authorship or a citation in a paper,
he or she now feels entitled to a patent. 20 5 Because research is an additive
process where one's research builds on the research of others, the "result
has been a spiral of overlapping patent claims in the hands of different
owners reaching ever further upstream." 20 6 Due to the difficulty of
navigating numerous patents and obtaining license agreements, "[b]y
conferring monopolies in discoveries, patents necessarily increase prices
and restrict use-a cost society pays to motivate invention and
disclosure. 20 7 Therefore, "[u]nable to procure a complete set of licenses,
firms choose between diverting resources to less promising projects with
fewer licensing obstacles or proceeding ... on the basis of incomplete
information." 20 8 These options for researchers do not ensure the progress
of the useful arts in the best possible way. In fact, they may serve to
inhibit
20 9
research, which "may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products.,
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also explored these issues.
Recently, the FTC issued a report about competition and patents. 210
Justifying its focus, the report stated that "[c]ompetition and patents stand
out among the federal policies that influence innovation[:] ... both.., can
foster innovation, but each requires a proper balance with the other to do
so. Errors or systematic biases in how one policy's rules are interpreted
and applied can harm the other policy's effectiveness. 21 1 The FTC report
endeavored to "discuss[] and make[] recommendations for the patent
21 2
system to maintain a proper balance with competition law and policy.
Patent law and antitrust concerns have been inexorably linked since
213
the drafting of the Constitution.
However, recently their relationship to
each other has changed: "[w]e have replaced the 1970s pattern of weak
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/162/3859/1243.pdf.

204. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 200, at 698.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 699.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 701.
210. FTC Report, supra note 46, at 1 n. 1.
211. Id. at 1.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Letters between Madison and Jefferson, in LETTERS, supra note 33, at 512,
545, 566, 630.
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patent law and strong antitrust law with a 1990s pattern of strong patent
law and weak antitrust law., 214 After surveying a representative sample
group, 2 15 the FTC made several conclusions: (1) "although most of the
patent system works well, some modifications are needed to maintain a
proper balance of competition and patent law and policy[,] ' ' 21 6 (2)

"questionable patents are a significant competitive concern and can harm
innovation" by "rais[ing] the costs[,]" "increase[ing] 'defensive patenting'
and licensing complications[,] ' '2 17 (3) certain patenting laws and procedures
raise competitive concerns, 21 8 and (4) more communication between the
219
antitrust agencies and patent institutions is necessary.
In recognition of these conclusions, the report made several
recommendations on how to remedy the problem. 220 Most interestingly, the

FTC report suggested creating "a new administrative procedure to allow
post-grant review of and opposition to patents," to lower the presumed
validity standard from "clear and convincing" to "preponderance of the
evidence," to tighten the "obviousness" determination standard so that
more patents can be considered obvious, to increase funding to the PTO
(which receives money from the Federal Government but currently is selffunded by fees from patent prosecutors 221 ), and to consider the
consequences of extending 222 the scope of patentable subject matter before
doing so. Interestingly, each recommendation involves either weakening
the patent right or tightening the standards according to which patents are
granted.
The FTC report's recommendations are stellar and, if enacted, would
aid the enforcement of the constitutional aims of patent protection.

214. John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and
Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 449 (1997).
215. The sample group included "business representatives from large and small firms, and the
independent inventor community; leading patent and antitrust organizations; leading antitrust and
patent practitioners; []leading scholars in economics and antitrust and patent law[; and,] business
representatives from mostly high-tech industries." FTC Report, supra note 46, at 3-4.
216. Id. at4.
217. Id. at 5-7.
218. Id. at 15.
219. Id. at 17.
220. Id. at 7-17. The report makes ten recommendations total.
221. MUELLER, supra note 75, at 23 ("USPTO has been fully 'user fee-funded' for several
years").
222. Note that two times recently the Federal Circuit has extended the scope of patentable
subject matter. In 1980 the Federal Circuit extended it to living organisms. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 316-17. In 1994 the extension was to programmed computers (encompassing business
methods, too). In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

256
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Congress has already adopted the FTC's recommendation 223 to publish
patent applications 18 months after the filing date. 4 However, most of the
recommendations remain unobserved in our patent laws or even in the
proposed 2005 legislation. Instead, the focus of the proposed legislation is
on harmonizing the patent system internationally rather than ensuring it
abides by its constitutional dictate.225
Similarly, the National Academies' National Research Council
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy, Policy
and Global Affairs Division issued a report detailing the state of the patent
system and reforms necessary to improve its functioning, entitled A Patent
System for the 21st Century.226 The report was issued in light of a
realization that
since 1980 a series of judicial, legislative, administrative, and
diplomatic actions have extended patenting to new technology
(biotechnology) and to technologies previously without or subject to
other forms of intellectual property protection (software), encouraged
the emergence of new players (universities and public research
institutions), strengthened the position of patent holders vis-a-vis
alleged infringers domestically and internationally, relaxed antitrust
constraints on the use of patents, and extended the reach of patenting
upstream from commercial products to scientific research tools,
materials, and discoveries. 227
The report also recognized that patent policy in the last 50 years had been
influenced by those in the legal profession or the legislature, and
endeavored to give the insights of businesspeople and scholars in the
sciences and social sciences on the issue of patent reform.
After giving the reasons to issue the report 228 and the seven criteria
used to evaluate the patent system, 229 the National Research Council
recommended seven reforms to the patent system: (1) "preserve a flexible,
unitary open-ended patent system,"230 (2) "reinvigorate the non-

223. FTC Report, supra note 46, at 15.
224. The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 established that most patent applications
would be published 18 months after filing. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
225. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
226. NRC Report, supra note 201, at 1-3.
227.

Id. at 1.
228. Id. at 19-38.
229. Id. at 39-79.
230. Id. at 83.
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obviousness standard, 23' (3) "institute a post grant open review
procedure, 232 (4) "strengthen USPTO capabilities, '233 (5) "shield some
research uses of patented inventions from infringement liability. ' 234 (6)
"limit the subjective elements of patent litigation,' 2 35 (7) "harmonize the
U.S., European, and Japanese patent examination systems. 236 Several of
these reforms, if enacted, would give proper balance to the patent system to
prevent strain and keep it in congruence with the constitutional aims of
patent protection. 237
In 2005, the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) conducted a random survey of its membership's opinions
regarding intellectual property patents.23 8 The survey "provide[d] insights
into the way scientists approach their own intellectual property, including
their motivations to protect it."' 239 The results of the survey suggest that
"there may be some appreciable differences in the methods by which
scientists in different fields and sectors protect and disseminate their
intellectual property." 240 The study concluded that "it appears that
academia has been less affected than industry by more restrictive formal
licensing practices in the acquisition and distribution of patented
technologies necessary for research" by a ratio of more than two to one.241
However, respondents in industry also reported "creating and holding"
more intellectual property, and relying more on licensing than respondents
in academia.24 2 Therefore, the differences in opinion can be explained by
industry's and academia's relative interactions with the patent system.
43
This, however, may gradually change as a result of the holding in Madey
and the Bayh-Dole Act,244 as academics participate increasingly in the

231.

Id. at 87.

232. Id. at 95.
233. Id. at 103.
234. Id. at 108.
235. NRC Report, supra note 201, at 117.
236. Id. at 123.
237. Id. at 1-8.
238. AAAS Report, supra note 201, at 5.
239. Id. at 6.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 8 (stating that industry is more than two times more affected than academia by
patenting concerns).
242. Id. at 9.
243. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (limiting the use of the
experimental use exception so that it is unavailable to researchers in academia).
244. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-214 (2000 & Supp. V.2005) (authorizes and encourages federally
funded institutions and research projects to seek patents and participate in"patent commerce");
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patent system.
There is also patent reform legislation pending before Congress that
would alter patenting. Representatives Xavier Becerra (D-CA) and Dave
Weldon (R-FL) co-sponsored the re-introduction of the Genomic Research
and Accessibility Act which would remove human genetic material from
the scope of patentable subject matter.24S In a press release announcing the
legislation, Reps. Becerra and Weldon highlighted the mounting evidence
that DNA patents are impeding genetic and medical research. Rep. Weldon
stated that
the practice of gene patenting is preventing critical research from
advancing because scientists are wary of trespassing patent laws,
[which] not only violates the spirit of the Human Genome Project,
[but also] hinders the discovery of medical breakthroughs that could
save lives. [The] bill is a common sense measure246to ensure that
genes yet unpatented remain the province of science.
Rep. Becerra supported the bill saying that "[they] seek simply to fix a
regulatory mistake. Genes are a product of nature; they were not created
by man, but instead are the very blueprint that creates man, and thus, are
not patentable. Gene patenting would be the analogous equivalent to
patenting water, air, birds or diamonds."2 47 Although the representatives'
statements in the press release are not entirely accurate, this legislation
represents an attempt to cure a perceived problem, namely that the scope of
patent issuing has become too broad.
Other legislation includes a bill introduced by Rep. Darrell Issa (RCA) currently in the Senate that was passed by the house on January 12,
2007.248 The bill proposes "to establish a pilot program in certain United
States district courts to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases

see comments at note 198, supra.
245. H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced "to amend title 35, United States Code, to
prohibit the patenting of human genetic material"). In 2002 a similar bill was sponsored by Rep.
Lynn Rivers (D-MI) entitled the Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act that was
intended "to amend title 35, United States Code, to provide for noninfringing uses of patents on
genetic sequence information for purposes of research and genetic diagnostic testing, and to
require public disclosure of such information in certain patent applications," but it never became
law. H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002).
246. Reps. Becerra and Weldon Introduce Bill to Ban the Practice of Gene Patenting,
http://weldon.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=57930 (last visited March 6,
2007).
247. Id.
248. H.R. 34, 110th Cong. (2007). This bill has been passed by the House, received and read
Committee
on
the Judiciary.
twice by the
Senate,
and
referred
to the
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 110-34 (last visited November 20, 2007).
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among district judges. 2 49 If passed, this bill would make at least five
district courts into patent expert courts by providing them with additional
education regarding patent cases and receiving extra money to pay for more
law clerks who are ready to assist in patent cases.
This pending legislation presents a mixed blessing for ensuring the
constitutionality of patent law. The creation of the Federal Circuit in
1982250 has had a significant impact on patent law by strengthening the
patent right and making litigation more predictable and streamlined. 251 It is
logical to assume that the creation of specialized district courts would have
similar effects on the patent right. The positive effects from this legislation
will be that patent infringement cases will receive a more sophisticated
analysis, patent litigation will be more predictable, and patent rights will be
better and more strongly enforced. However, these phenomena will be
negative if the current infirmities in the patent system continue to exist.
Therefore, if this legislation passes, it will become more imperative for
Congress and the courts to address the growing concerns about patents.
VI. Conclusion
The patent system has transformed dramatically over the last several
years, and Congress is prepared to institute more changes to the Patent Act.
Overall these changes have promoted grating patents and have strengthened
patent rights. Even though patent filing numbers have increased at nearly
exponential rates,252 it is not conclusive that grants of patents have
encouraged research or incentivized innovation. 3 Instead, some argue that
the patent right has led to less innovation because it is impeding research,254
and the strength of the right has stifled competition,255 which is the most
efficient and trusted way to encourage innovation.2 56 The Clause in the
Constitution requires at a minimum all patent protection to promote the
progress of the useful arts. Both Congress and the courts need to reassess
current patent protection and institute reforms that will maintain the quid

249. Id.
250. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 37, 37
(1982).
251. See Barton, supra note 214, at 1.
252.
253.

James, supra note 7, at 98-100.
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 200, at 698, 701.
254. Id. at 698.
255. See Barton, supra note 214, at 464, 466.
256. AREEDA , supra note 8, at 5. This source also notes that non-patent incentives are often
sufficient to recoup research costs and to provide sufficient profit to inventors before competitors
enter the market so that innovation is encouraged. Id. at 105.

260
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pro quo of patenting and satisfy the constitutional aims. To achieve this,
Congress and the courts should enact at least some of the above
suggestions.
The presumption of patent validity, or the standard by which validity
must be disproved, should be lowered. This would enable the courts to
demand closer adherence to the best mode disclosure requirement, to
dismiss patents without significant utility, and to ensure inventions are nonobvious in light of prior art. This way the public can be certain to receive
the benefit of the bargain. Congress should not legislate to eliminate best
mode disclosure or to create a first-to-invent system: although the
incentives to create a uniform international system are great, they do not,
and must not, supersede the Constitution's dictates. Congress should
legislate to heighten the patent standards. Specifically, Congress should
reformulate the standard for obviousness determinations, as per the detailed
suggestions in the FTC and NRC reports,257 and should strengthen the
utility requirement.
Additionally, as the reports suggest, the scope of patentable subject
matter should be reconsidered. Biotechnology presents significantly more
patent concerns than do other technologies.258 Before the field is

257. See FTC Report, supra note 46, at 7-17; NRC Report, supra note 201, at 1-8.
258. The field of biotechnology is fundamentally different and presents problems for patents
not present in software, for example. Biotechnology is an "unpredictable art," where patented
technologies are not only products of hard work, but also are the actual tools for research, the
pathways of biological processes, and components of life. See Barton, supra note 214, at 449.
Biotechnology patenting deals with particularly complex and mutating matter, morality, and large
sums of money and for these reasons it is complex. It was only just over fifty years ago that
Watson and Crick discovered the structure ofDNA. J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, A Structurefor
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, NATURE, April 25, 1953, at 737-38; see generally JAMES D. WATSON,
THE DOUBLE HELIX: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE STRUCTURE OF DNA

73-100 (Touchstone, 2001) (1968). Subsequent advances such as cell lines, animal models, and
cell transfecting techniques have rapidly advanced the field. Peter Gwynne & Gary Heebner,
Advances in: Genomics, SCIENCE, Oct. 14, 2005, at 349-351. Regardless of the recent changes,
however, the nature ofbiotechnology introduces certain complications into the patenting process.
First of all, biotechnology involves elements and materials for encoding, creating, and
mutating living organisms, including humans. For this reason alone, many believe that the field
presents substantive and moral challenges not present in other fields. Substantively, because
patent law prohibits granting patents on living organisms, because, as products of nature, ,they are
naturally occurring and not man-made, and therefore they have not been "invented" but merely
"discovered." See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). There are moral issues as well, because some people
find it threatening or offensive to think that life, or subcomponents of life, can be patented or
owned-they worry it is one step closer to cloning humans.
For example, two researchers filed for a patent on a chimeric organism (part human part
non-human, non-primate). See USPTO: Still No Patent on Life Containing Human Cells,
http://patentlaw.typepad.compatent/2005/02/uspto-still-no-.html (last visited March 7, 2007);
Rick Weiss, US Denies Patent for Part-Human Hybrid, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 2005,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/02/13/us-denies-patent-for-part-
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completely littered and obscured by patents, Congress must re-evaluate the
wisdom of extending the protection. Perhaps biotechnology patents should
be treated under a different patenting rubric entirely.
human-hybrid/ (last visited March 7, 2007). Although this organism complied with every
statutory requirement for patentability (based on the broad scope of patentable subject matter for
life forms created by Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980)), it was nevertheless
rejected during prosecution. The reason cited was that humans are not patentable subject matter.
The researchers have not appealed the decision. However, myriad patents exist on living mice
and other animals, and the chimera patent was only for an animal containing some human DNA.
Although the patent rejection was never appealed, it shows that there is something fundamentally
different about patenting life, particularly when it approaches human life.
Also, pending legislation in the House proposes removing the human genome from the
scope of patentable subject matter. Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th
Cong. (2007). Although the Human Genome Project attempted to take human genetic material
out of the scope of patentability by establishing it as prior art, human genes are already widely
patented. The prospect of patented human material makes many uncomfortable.
These
patentability concerns highlight differences people perceive when patents encroach upon human
biology. Patenting human life is different. Concerns about morality and ethics regarding the
invention arise in the field of biotechnology, concerns not present when patenting software.
Additionally, the field is unique because the claimed material in biotech patents is
exceedingly technical, which makes patent prosecution and claim construction during litigation
challenging. Further, different labs that perform the same experiments with the same methods
may yield varying or even contradictory results. Occasionally cell lines or bacteria strains mutate
in unexpected ways, which furthers the difficulties of patenting inventions. Also, biological
research is often unpredictable and seemingly random. There are issues "such as [] filing date,
deposits of biological material .... [the] existence of company documents and published works,"
and varying discovery processes between "inventions developed through basic research as
opposed to those developed through applied research" that significantly affect patenting. James,
supra note 7, at 142.
Exploiting a biotechnology patent can generate billions of dollars of annual revenue for
the assignee. In 1997, Amgen received profits of roughly $1.1 billion from its patent covering the
anti-coagulant
EPO.
See
Answers.com,
Amgen,
Inc.
Company
History,
http://www.answers.com/topic/amgen-inc (last visited March 6, 2007). Litigation disputes can
involve "millions of dollars in biotechnology research and investments, and billions of dollars in
future revenue," James, supra note 7, at 141, and many biotech companies carry their worth in
their patents. Id. at 97. See Council for Responsible Genetics, DNA Patents Create Monopolies
on Living Organisms (April 2000), http://www.actionbioscience.org/genomic/crg.html (last
visited March 6, 2007) (discussing the recent rapid developments in biotechnology and how these
patents are used by scientists and corporations for commercial profit and for private exploitation).
Biotechnology research is expensive, see e.g., B.U. Sch. Med. Dep't Genetics and Genomics,
Microarray Resource: Pricing, http://gg.bu.edu/microarray/pricing.htm (last visited March 6,
2007) (stating that the cost of running a single microarray experiment can cost up to one thousand
dollars), but nevertheless, biotech companies spend more of their revenue derived from patents on
advertising than on continued research and development, or making up for costs associated with
the drug approval process.
Finally, United States' patent practices are inextricably bound with the health care
industry. Although far too complex a topic to explore here, increasing numbers of patents on
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, as well as the increased costs of research in the
biotechnology arena due to the high number of patents on research tools, inevitably increases the
costs of health care and treatment. For this reason too, the biotech research area should be
considered differently.
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Finally, if patents continue to be issued for under-deserving
inventions, and, especially in biotechnology where many research tools are
patented, continue to impede the execution of research, the experimental
use exception must be reinvigorated. Without it, it is foreseeable that
academic institutions and scientific journals will begin to perish because
the only thing driving researchers will be patents, rather than publishing
and contributing to the pool of knowledge.
Most importantly, our patent laws and enforcement systems must
place a greater emphasis on granting patents that will further constitutional
objectives rather than further "patent commerce." As Justice Douglas
noticed in 1950:
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception of
patents than the Constitution contemplates have been persistent. The
Patent Office, like most administrative agencies, has looked with
favor on the opportunity which the exercise of discretion affords to
expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has placed a host of gadgets
under the armour of patents-gadgets that obviously have had no
place in the constitutional scheme of advancing scientific knowledge.
9
[There is] pressure to extend monopoly to the simplest of devices.
In 2007, the phenomenon of which Justice Douglas warned has
become widespread. The legislatures must pass laws, and the PTO and
courts must strictly enforce those laws, to ensure that patent rights do not
extend to the "simplest of devices" or the most basic tools of research.

259. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring).

